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Abstract 
A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the 
wrong reasons for individual rights and duties.  The reason why I must 
not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to 
you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants 
in that practice.  Common targets of this objection include the theories of 
Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. 
I argue that:  (1) The conventionalism of these theories is superfi-
cial.  (2) Genuinely conventionalist theories are not vulnerable to the ob-
jection.  (3) Genuine moral conventionalism is independently plausible. 
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‘Conventionalist’ or ‘practice views’ of morality are a large and diverse 
group.  Contractarians (Hobbes or Gauthier), rule-consequentialists 
(Hooker), Neo-Aristotelians (Anscombe or Foot), evolutionary ethicists 
(Binmore), and Rawls are commonly regarded as conventionalists; many 
treatments also include Hume (e.g. Kolodny and Wallace [2003: sec. 1]; 
Owens [2011: sec. 3]).1 
The following definition seems thin enough to captures all of these 
views:  Moral conventionalists believe that many moral rights and duties 
are assigned within social practices, and they believe that these practices 
play an important role in justifying an individual’s rights and duties.  
Thomas Scanlon [1990: 199], in his famous critique of conventionalism, 
defines the target as follows: On a conventionalist view, 
the analysis of the obligation […] is a two-stage affair. First, there is the 
social practice, which consists in the fact that a given group of people gen-
erally behave in a certain way, have certain expectations and intentions, 
and accept certain principles as norms. Second, there is a moral judgement 
to the effect that, given these social facts, a certain form of behaviour (is 
possible and) is morally wrong. 
Others additionally claim that the ‘task for a conventionalist theory’ is to 
use the justification of the practice ‘to explain why it is that we have an obliga-
tion’ [Habib 2014: sec. 5.3, §2].  As will become clear below, however, this 
is true only of contractualism and rule-consequentialism. 
The most significant objection to conventionalism says that con-
ventionalists give the wrong reasons for an individual’s rights and duties 
[Scanlon 1990: 200, 221].  Hobbes [1651: ch. 15, §7], for instance, justifies 
my duty to keep a promise by saying that its breach might erode the whole 
practice of promising.  The damage done to the practice, however, seems 
to be the wrong justification.  This comes out in the fact that it identifies 
the wrong victim in cases where that duty is violated:  If Hobbes is right, 
my breach harms everyone who is harmed by an attack on the practice, 
and not mainly (or only) the promisee.  That, in turn, seem to be all those 
‘who have contributed to and benefit from the practice’ [Scanlon 1990: 
221]—including me, the wrong-doer!  Let’s call this the ‘wrong reason 
objection’. 
There are further objections to moral conventionalism.  For prom-
ising, Thomas Scanlon and others (e.g. Shiffrin [2008]; Gilbert [2011]) 
                                                 
1 For an overview, see Taylor [2013: sec. 1–2]. 
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claim that we don’t need the concept of a practice in order to justify the 
duties.  The wrong reason objection, however, is particularly pressing.  
First, it is an objection to the whole conventionalist project—as opposed 
to conventionalism about promising in particular.  Second, it does not 
presuppose any moral theory.  It simply requires the intuition that the 
wrong we commit in disrespecting a duty is a wrong against that person 
whom we owe the duty.  Third, the wrong reason objection is accepted 
even by many who reject Scanlon’s counterproposal (e.g. Kolodny and 
Wallace [2003: 125–6]; Owens [2006: 53–9]; Darwall [2011: sec. 3]).  I 
myself believe that the wrong reason objection is correct.  We should re-
ject any theory to which it applies, and it applies to the theories of Hobbes, 
Gauthier, and Hooker, and also to Rawls’ theory (on a common reading). 
My project might hence appear surprising.  (1) I shall argue that the 
aforementioned theories are not genuinely conventionalist.  A conven-
tionalist, I argue, is someone who justifies practice-internal rights and du-
ties by some fact for which the rules of the practice in question assign this 
right or prescribe this duty.  The mentioned authors, however, collapse 
the justification of practice-internal rights and duties either into the justi-
fication of this practice (Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker) or into a general re-
quirement to comply with justified practices (Rawls).  (2) I show that the 
aforementioned theories are vulnerable to the wrong reason objection 
precisely because their conventionalism is superficial.  (3) I argue that gen-
uinely conventionalist theories avoid the wrong reason objection.  (4) I 
outline one such theory, and I argue that it is a plausible view. 
I start by identifying how genuinely conventionalist theories justify 
moral rights and duties (section 2).  I then show that contractarianism and 
rule-consequentialism (sections 3–4) as well as Rawls’ theory (section 5) 
justify moral rights and duties through something different.  As it turns 
out, their lack of conventionalism is what validates the wrong reason ob-
jection against them.  I then argue that conventionalist theories identify 
the correct reasons for our duties (section 6).  Finally, I outline a plausible 
conventionalist theory (sections 7–9).  All authors I shall discuss have 
written about promising; hence promising will serve as my main example. 
2 Conventionalists Justify by a Fact within a Prac-
tice 
A conventionalist justification of a moral duty justifies the duty by con-
ventions.  A conventionalist holds that the duty exists as part of a larger 
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social game, a ‘practice’.  She justifies the duty by pointing out that a rule 
of the practice prescribes it for the case in question.  To give an example: 
A conventionalist justification for my duty to φ after I promised to φ 
would proceed from the assumption that my duty exists as part of the 
practice of promising.  A conventionalist would justify my duty simply by 
pointing out that a rule of this practice requires me to φ after I’ve made a 
certain announcement.  My duty exists within a social practice, and it is 
justified by the application of the rules of that practice to some empirical 
fact.  The following formula is a first approximation of the conventionalist 
position: 
F1 Conventionalism (preliminary formulation)  
 
If the rules of practice P say that X must φ given fact F, then, given 
F, X must φ because of F. 
I shall refer to instantiations of F as ‘facts within a practice’.  Suppose that 
the practice in question is the practice of promising.  Juliet may have a 
duty to be at Romeo’s place at 5 p.m. because of F, where F is the fact 
that she told him she would pick him up at 5 p.m.  Similarly, Juliet may 
have a duty to pay Romeo $5,000 because of F, where F is the fact that 
she signed a lease with him.  Or suppose the practice in question is the 
practice of private property.  In that case, Juliet may have a duty to pay 
Romeo $5,000 because of F, where F is the fact that she damaged his 
vehicle.  And the same form of justification applies to other duties and 
other practices. 
Depending on your view of the relevant practice, such duties will 
either be prima facie or all-out duties.  To me, the view that they are prima 
facie seems more plausible:  Juliet’s duties could be trumped by conflicting 
duties, voided by additional facts, or waived by Romeo.  However, con-
ventionalism does not commit you one way or the other.  A convention-
alist could hold, for example, that promises must never be broken, or that 
property rights can never be trumped. 
Note also that to subscribe to F1 is not to regard all moral duties as 
conventional.  F1 treats only of practice-internal duties, and perhaps not 
all moral duties are of this kind.  For instance, one could think that duties 
of justice are practice-internal whereas duties of charity are not. 
For my purposes, the most important feature of genuinely conven-
tionalist justifications is this:  The justification of the overall practice may 
at most constitute a necessary background condition for the justification of 
my practice-internal duty.  It cannot serve to justify that duty itself.  A 
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conventionalist would tell me, ‘You must φ because that’s what the rules 
of promising say for F.’  She would be free to add, ‘Provided that prom-
ising is a justified practice.’  In that case, she holds that one can be bound 
by a rule of P only if P is a justified practice.  A conventionalist could not, 
however, use the justification of P to justify my individual duty.  What 
justifies my duty simply is that our social rules dictate that duty for the 
fact in question.  This formula summarizes this refined conventionalist 
position: 
F2 Conventionalism  
 
If the rules of practice P say that X must φ given fact F, and P is a 
justified practice, then, given F, X must φ because of F. 
Suppose that I promised to transfer $100 into your bank account.  On F2, 
the justification for my duty to then transfer $100 to you is that I promised 
to transfer $100 to you.  The practice of promising contains a rule that we 
can state as the following conditional:  If X announces to Y in the right 
way that she will φ (that is, if X promises), then X has a duty towards Y 
to φ.  I’m X; you are Y; φ-ing is transferring $100.  The reason for my duty 
to perform this action is that which is mentioned in the antecedent:  I 
promised it to you. 
According to F2, I am only required to pay if promising is a justified 
practice.  That is a precondition.  But the justification of the practice of 
promising is not mentioned again in the justification of my duty—that is, 
it is not picked up again in the because-clause of F2.  For a conventional-
ist, the justification of the practice of promising has the same status as, 
for instance, the US currency or its banking system.  All three must be in 
place in order for me to have a duty to transfer you $100.  But neither the 
Dollar nor the banking system nor the justification of the practice of 
promising are part of the justification of my duty.  The justification for 
my duty is that I promised.  The three mentioned facts only form the 
necessary background on which my duty can exist.2 
One might wonder here:  Doesn’t promising differ from the other 
two existential presuppositions in that it has a ‘moral flavour’? That is true, 
but all it means is that my duty to pay you can be classified as a moral duty.  
I shall below spell this out as: a duty within a practice that has a certain 
                                                 
2 For more on how the background of the practice turns mere announce-
ments into promises, see Nieswandt [2017: sec. 2.2 and 3.1]. 
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kind of function in human life (sec. 8).  Our story about this function, 
however, is not part of the justification of my duty, not even indirectly. 
I argued that conventionalist theories justify practice-internal duties 
by some fact within the practice.  In order to determine whether a theory 
is conventionalist, we need to determine whether it fulfils this criterion.  
To that end, let us consider what different authors say about the same 
example: the duties created by a promise. 
3 Contractarians and Rule-Consequentialists Jus-
tify by the Telos of the Practice 
Practices are generally thought to be justified by the goods that they help 
us achieve.  The practice of promising is usually said to help us achieve 
goods which require us to rely on others: either because these goods re-
quire cooperation [Rawls 1999: ch. 52, §7] or because others possess the 
necessary skills or resources [Anscombe 1981a: 18] or because others 
could destroy everything we laboured to build [Hobbes, 1651: ch. 15, §4–
8].  People at all times and places have needed methods to ensure a certain 
comportment by others, and promising is usually seen as one of these 
methods.3 
Since Hume, philosophers wonder how this admittedly useful prac-
tice can generate moral rights and duties.  To promise is to give a sign by 
which one artificially creates a duty for oneself [Anscombe 1981b: 98–9].  
That sign may be an explicit utterance, such as ‘I promise to φ’; but it may 
just as well consist in a nod at the right moment or in writing one’s name 
in a certain place.  Once we signalled that we will φ, we have a duty to φ.  
Such are the rules of the practice. 
In our daily lives, we often have incentives to keep our promises:  
Others will reproach and press us if we don’t.  Some people, however, 
reproach you for all kinds of things—for instance, for breaking ‘silly rules 
of etiquette’ [Foot 2001: 17].  Why is the reproach that you broke your 
promise ‘of any more significance than: “You eat your peas with your 
knife”’ [Anscombe 1981a: 16]? 
Contractarians and rule-consequentialists give the following answer 
to Hume’s question: 
                                                 
3 Hobbes and Hume even take promising to be a prerequisite for human 
life as a group. 
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F3 Contractarianism and Rule-Consequentialism  
 
If the rules of practice P say that X must φ given fact F, and P is a 
justified practice, then, given F, X must φ because of that which justi-
fies P. 
Take Hobbes, for whom the ultimate reason to do anything is self-inter-
est.  Hobbes argues that we must keep even those promises that seem to 
violate self-interest, since defection, if discovered, can lead to our expul-
sion from ‘any society that unite themselves for peace and defence’ [1651: 
ch. 15, §4].  Furthermore, by an eventual gain through defection on our 
part, ‘others are taught to gain the same in like manner’ [1651: ch. 15, §7], 
which means that we erode the whole practice.  Both exclusion from and 
destruction of the practice would deprive us of those goods that the prac-
tice was supposed to help us achieve in the first place.  Thus, although 
defection sometimes seems to advance our interests, it likely harms us in 
the long run.  Hence we should not defect.  We can formulate this 
Hobbesian application of F3 to promising as follows: 
F4 Contractarianism for Promising  
 
If the rules of promising say that X must φ given fact F, and prom-
ising is a justified practice in that promising furthers X’s own good, then, 
given F, X must φ because φ-ing furthers X’s own good. 
F4 is also held by Gauthier [1986: ch. 7] and many evolutionary ethicists 
(e.g. Binmore [2005]).  Rule-consequentialists subscribe to a slightly dif-
ferent application of F3.  Hooker [2000: 94] echoes Hobbes’ argument 
that defection or too many exceptions lead to the destruction of a practice: 
[I]f we just had the one rule ‘Maximize the good’, sooner or later awareness 
of this would become widespread.  […]  Trust would break down.  In 
short, terrible consequences would result from the public expectation that 
this rule would prescribe killing, stealing, and so on when such acts would 
maximize the good.4 
                                                 
4 Hooker’s [2000: 95] second argument strikes a similar tone:  ‘[A] morality 
comprised of just the one rule “Maximize the good” would have ex-
tremely high internalization costs’, since it would require extensive train-
ing to ‘get people to always be perfectly impartial’.  Here, too, the reason 
why we should stick to practice-internal duties is that this will (better) 
promote the overall aim of the practice. 
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Contrary to Hobbes, however, consequentialists have an altruistic con-
ception of the goods that practices help us achieve.  A traditional rule-
utilitarian, for instance, would say that, in the long run, we bring about the 
greatest good of the greatest number if we respect every promise: 
F5 Rule-Utilitarianism for Promising  
 
If the rules of promising say that X must φ given fact F, and prom-
ising is a justified practice in that promising furthers the greatest good of 
the greatest number, then, given F, X must φ because φ-ing furthers the 
greatest good of the greatest number. 
4 Contractarianism and Rule-Consequentialism 
Are Not Conventionalist 
None of these justifications are conventionalist.  F3–F5 make apparent 
that contractarianism and rule-consequentialism ultimately give the same 
justification for X’s individual duty to φ that they give for practice P.  The 
justification for the practice of promising is that it furthers the relevant 
good, and the justification for X’s duty to keep her promise is also that 
that furthers the relevant good.  Thus, contractarianism and rule-conse-
quentialism do not justify practice-internal duties by a fact within the prac-
tice.  They instead justify them by the good to be achieved through that 
practice.  Contrast this with the application of F2 to promising: 
F6 Conventionalism for Promising  
 
If the rules of promising say that X must φ given fact F, and prom-
ising is a justified practice in that promising furthers … [pick your favour-
ite], then, given F, X must φ because of F. 
Here, the justification for my duty is not some good to be achieved 
through the practice of promising.  The justification of promising is not 
even picked up again in the because-clause.  Instead, the justification for 
my duty simply is that I promised.  I gave the sign; the rule says that I must 
φ if I gave the sign; now I must φ because I gave the sign. 
F2 and F3 can be understood as mirror images of each other. On 
F2, the good to be secured through the practice is a necessary condition 
for the duty.  That which justifies the duty, however, is a fact for which 
the rules of the practice prescribe this duty.  F3 says the reverse:  That the 
rules of the practice prescribe this duty is a necessary condition for the 
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duty.  That which justifies the duty, however, is the good to be secured 
through the practice.  F3 contains a conventionalist element, since the 
duty would not exist if it weren’t for the rules.  But F3 does not justify the 
duty by convention.5 
We saw that F3 collapses the practice-internal justification into the 
justification of the practice.  This move is what invites the wrong reason 
objection.  Let’s again consider promising.  If I promise to mow your 
lawn, then, according to F5, I must mow your lawn because this furthers 
the greatest good of the greatest number.  According to F4, I must mow 
your lawn because this furthers my own good.  Either of these justifica-
tions might or might not justify the practice of promising.  Both, however, 
seem inapt as justifications for my duty to you.  Imagine I chose not to 
mow your lawn.  Then the rule-consequentialist would say that I am 
wronging all of humanity (or all sentient beings) by breaking my prom-
ise—instead of mainly (or only) wronging you, the promisee.  The con-
tractarian would say that I am not wronging anyone; I’m being impru-
dent.6 
                                                 
5 The same is true of Erin Taylor’s [2013] ‘new conventionalism’.  Taylor 
[2013: sec. 4.1] follows Scanlon in that the reason why X must φ is the 
promisee’s legitimate expectation that X will φ (an actual expectation for 
Scanlon, a potential one for Taylor).  Against Scanlon, she argues that we 
need the practice of promising to determine whether Y’s expectation is 
indeed legitimate.  However, Taylor calls X’s duty ‘conventionally medi-
ated’, not ‘conventional’, and indeed her account is no closer to F6 than 
is Scanlon’s.  She would say:  If the rules of promising say that X must φ 
given fact F, and promising is a justified practice, then, given F, X must φ 
because if Y had formed the expectation that X will φ, then this expectation would 
have been legitimate.  We must hence ask whether, for Taylor, the following 
is a general moral principle or a rule of a social practice: 
F* If you act in such a way that someone else could form a legitimate 
expectation that you will φ, then you must φ. 
I take it that F* (just like Scanlon’s Principle F) is a general moral principle, 
in which case her account is not conventionalist in my sense.  Neverthe-
less, F6 and New Conventionalism share a common element:  That prom-
ising is justified is a condition of the possibility of X’s duty.  In this sense, both 
can be called ‘transcendental’ [Taylor 2013: fn. 2]. 
6 Could there be cases where both F2 and F3 apply?  That is, cases where 
X must φ because of some fact for which the rules of the relevant practice 
prescribe φ-ing and because of that which justifies the relevant practice?  
There might be such cases, but those are not at stake in the debate:  
(1) The wrong reason objection targets cases where the justification of the 
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It hence is the fact that these theories justify my duty to you by the 
larger purpose of promising which validates the wrong reason objection.  
Their problem is the conflation of justifications of and within a practice 
famously described by Rawls [1955]. 
5 Rawls Justifies by the Principle of Fairness 
Rawls’ own theory does not conflate these justifications.  Nevertheless, it 
is a target of the wrong reason objection.  Rawls [1999: ch. 52, §6] says 
about promising:  ‘Once a person […] has made a bona fide promise’ the 
‘principle of fidelity’ kicks in, which says ‘that bona fide promises are to be 
kept’.  This ‘principle of fidelity is a moral principle, a consequence of the 
principle of fairness’. 
[B]y making a promise one invokes a social practice and accepts the ben-
efits that it makes possible.  […] Having, then, availed ourselves of the 
practice for this reason, we are under an obligation to do as we promised 
by the principle of fairness. [Rawls 1999: ch. 52, §7]  
The principle of fairness imposes this obligation, since it 
holds that a person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an 
institution when two conditions are met:  first, the institution is just (or 
fair), that is, it satisfies the two principles of justice; and second one has 
voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement […]. [Rawls 1999: 
ch. 18, §5] 
Judging from these passages, Rawls justifies practice-internal duties as fol-
lows: 
                                                 
practice gives the wrong reason for the individual’s duty.  It does not pre-
suppose that the justification of the practice could never be the right rea-
son for the individual’s duty.  (2) Those who make the wrong reason ob-
jection claim that practice views justify individual duties in only the manner 
of F3.  For my purposes, it hence suffices to hold that some principle 
other than F3 is true and allows us to evade the objection; I don’t have to 
claim that principles like F3 (or its applications F4 and F5) are false.  How-
ever, once we focus on the cases that are problematic for F3, and we have 
additional principles that can handle these cases, there will be little reason 
to keep F3.  (This case is different from the civil/criminal law case dis-
cussed on p. 10 below.  There, we have two F2-style justifications for the 
same duty.) 
Nieswandt, What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties? 
 
11/21 
F7 Rawls’ Contractualism  
 
If the rules of practice P say that X must φ given fact F, and P is a 
justified practice in that P fulfils the two principles of justice, and X 
has voluntarily accepted the benefits of P, then, given F, X must φ 
because the principle of fairness requires X to follow the rules of justified prac-
tices whose benefits X has voluntarily accepted. 
On the most common reading, F7 derives practice-internal duties ‘from a 
general obligation to the members of the group who have contributed to and 
benefit from the practice’ [Scanlon 1990: 221, emphasis added].7  On this 
reading, practice-internal duties are duties that we have towards the com-
munity.  Everyone playing by the rules of the practice does their fair share, 
whereas those who violate the rules violate a general requirement of fair-
ness towards these honest participants. 
On this account, the duty is again owed to the wrong addressee:  In 
breaking the promise, we wrong every participant in the practice of prom-
ising, not mainly (or only) the promisee.8  The account is furthermore 
non-conventionalist.  After all, the principle of fairness precedes all prac-
tices.  It is that which requires us to comply with the rules of justified 
practices. 
6 Conventionalism Identifies the Right Reasons 
We saw that neither contractualism nor rule-consequentialism nor Rawls’ 
theory of promising are conventionalist, and that the wrong reason objec-
tion applies to them because they are not conventionalist. 
This does not automatically allow us to conclude that convention-
alism is not vulnerable to the wrong reason objection:  More than one 
feature can make a theory identify the wrong reasons for our duties.  We 
need additional arguments that conventionalism doesn’t do so.  Now, it 
is difficult to show in general of any moral theory that it identifies the 
right reasons for our duties.  Rather than giving a general proof, I will 
hence apply F6 to our previous examples and show that it yields plausible 
results. 
                                                 
7 Kolodny and Wallace [2003: 122], for example, and Habib [2014: sec. 
5.3–4] follow this interpretation. 
8 Many recent discussions of conventionalism treat F3 and F7 together 
(e.g. Shiffrin [2008: 482–3]; Taylor [2013: 667–8]). 
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On F6, ‘conventionalism for promising’, the reason why I must 
mow your lawn is a fact for which the rules of promising say that I must 
mow it.  We are engaged in the practice of promising; that practice has 
certain rules; and because this-and-that is the case, one of these rules now 
applies to me and puts me under a duty. 
That which is the case is that I carried out a certain action:  I prom-
ised.  My promising created the duty because the rules of the practice of 
promising say that it does.  Within the practice of promising, the addressee 
of my duty is that person towards whom I acted in the manner that the 
rule specifies, in this case: you.  So, conventionalism about promising says:  
I have a duty to do as I promised because I promised.  And my duty is 
owed to that person to whom I promised.  That seems to be the correct 
result.9 
Promising is just one example of a practice.  Not in all cases will my 
practice-internal duty be created through an action of mine or through an 
action at all.  Take the practice of property:  My duty not to use a particular 
computer could be owed to the fact that this computer is yours.  In that 
case, there perhaps is a past action on your part that created my duty:  You 
bought the computer.  Or there was an action on the part of a third per-
son, who gave this computer to you as a present.  Or there was no action 
at all:  The previous owner peacefully passed away, and you inherited the 
computer.  Nevertheless, the rules of the practice assign me a duty:  Own-
ers like you have certain rights that put all others, including me, under 
corresponding duties. 
For a conventionalist, the addressee of a duty is determined by the 
rules of the relevant practice.  (Which is not to say, of course, that there 
couldn’t be difficult or vague cases.)  If my duty to pay someone was gen-
erated within the practice of promising, then the addressee will be the 
person to whom I made the corresponding announcement.  If the same 
duty is owed within the practice of private property, then the relevant fact 
will be different:  The addressee of my duty might be someone whose 
property I damaged. 
An interesting illustration of this is the difference in addressee for 
one and the same duty within the practice of criminal law versus within 
the practice of civil law.  Suppose I deliberately injure someone.  Within 
                                                 
9 Theories which identify the promisee’s expectations as reason for my 
duty have this result only if ‘I promised’ and ‘I (potentially) created a le-
gitimate expectation’ are intensionally equivalent [Thompson 2012].  Af-
ter all, ‘… is the reason why X must φ’ creates an intensional context. 
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the practice of civil law, the duty that my action violated is understood as 
a duty owed to the victim.  I would be accused by a representative of that 
victim, a private lawyer, and my punishment would likely be a compensa-
tion payment to the victim.  Within the practice of criminal law, the duty 
that my action violated is understood as a duty owed to the whole com-
munity.  I would be accused by a representative of that community, a 
public prosecutor, and my punishment would likely be imprisonment.  
Thus, one and the same duty is owed to different people within these two 
different legal practices.  If conventionalism is true and both civil law and 
criminal law are justified practices, then there are at least two reasons why 
I must not injure anyone: that doing so would wrong the injured person 
and that I owe it to my fellow citizens collectively.  
Note that criminal law is an interesting practice with respect to our 
topic.  Scanlon and others criticize accounts according to which duties are 
owed to all participants in a practice.  As we have seen, this criticism is 
often justified.  Criminal law, however, constitutes an exception.  Within 
criminal law, the duties owed are indeed owed to all participants in the 
practice.  We might say:  The views criticized by Scanlon and others treat 
all practices on the model of criminal law. 
I claim that it is only within a practice that facts such as the examples 
in this section create duties. Within the practice of promising, my an-
nouncement to pay you $5,000 creates a duty for me to pay you $5,000. 
Outside of this practice, the same announcement might not create a duty. 
And within another practice, a completely different kind of fact could cre-
ate the same duty—for instance, the fact that I injured you considered 
within the practice of civil law. On my analysis, the practice determines 
what facts count as reasons for individual duties as well as what these 
duties are.  Within the practice of promising, my announcement consti-
tutes a reason; within civil law, my infliction of the injury is a reason for 
the very same duty. If my analysis is correct, then it trivially follows that 
conventionalism identifies the correct reasons, for it says precisely this: 
that the reasons are whatever the practice determines the reasons to be. 
7 A Plausible Conventionalism? 
I argued that conventionalism gives the right reasons for our moral du-
ties—at least for those that exist as part of practices.  That certainly speaks 
in its favour:  If a moral theory gives the right reasons for our moral duties, 
then that seems a strong reason to adopt it.  Some readers might wonder, 
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however, what a fully formulated conventionalist position looks like.  So 
far, all I have said is that conventionalist theories accept F2, which leaves 
room for a whole family of moral theories. 
As a last step, let me therefore outline one particular proposal around 
F2—one which, in my mind, combines elements of social constructivism 
with moral realism into a plausible metaethical framework.10  This discus-
sion will have to be brief.  I shall structure it around the two main features 
that any plausible conventionalism must have: 
A. A plausible conventionalism must be truly normative; that is, it 
must describe moral rights and duties as moral rather than pure 
social entities. 
B. A plausible conventionalism must be truly conventionalist; that is, 
it must not collapse into one of the ‘pseudo-conventionalist’ views 
rejected earlier. 
Section 8 deals with Condition A.  Section 9 addresses Condition B. 
8 How to Avoid Relativism 
Any conventionalist proposal starts from F2, the claim that practice-in-
ternal rights and duties are justified by a fact for which the rules of the 
practice prescribe them.  Practices are socially constructed.  This can seem 
to imply an implausible cultural relativism.  The worry is that convention-
alism says:  You have whatever right or duty our practice assigns you, and 
you have it only because we assign it to you.  That, however, is too quick:  
The claim that the practice is socially constructed does not entail that that 
which justifies the practice is socially constructed. 
Assume that the practice is justified by something that is not socially 
constructed.  Here are some candidate justifications for a practice P:  
(1) The greatest good of the greatest number can be better furthered with 
P than without it.  (2) P maximizes everybody’s individual gains.  (3) P is 
required in order for us to treat others as ends in themselves.  These are 
just examples; F2 can be combined with any moral theory that allows for 
a teleological reading.  In all three examples, the justification of the prac-
tice is not conventional. 
                                                 
10 Nothing in the previous sections hangs on this proposal:  You can ac-
cept the first part of this paper but reject the particular conventionalism 
outlined now. 
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The account on which I want to expand here combines F2 with a 
fourth choice: (4) P is necessary for a good human life.  This Aristotelian 
proposal grounds socially constructed systems of practices in human na-
ture but regards human nature as not socially constructed.  The basic com-
ponents for this conception can already be found in the work of Elizabeth 
Anscombe [1981a; 1981c].  Similar proposals have been advanced by 
Philippa Foot [2001: ch. 3], Martha Nussbaum [2011: ch. 2] and Amartya 
Sen [1992]. 
Where does such a justification of practices through universalist 
claims about human nature leave us with respect to rights and duties?  In-
terestingly, the suggested view makes space for universal rights and duties 
in a fairly robust sense.  It is often assumed that if a right Q is socially 
constructed, then Q cannot be universal.  The Aristotelian hybrid, how-
ever, enables us to argue along the following lines:  Certain goods are nec-
essary for a good human life.  Let G be one of these goods, and suppose 
that, in order to achieve G, it is necessary for any community to have 
practice P and for P to contain right Q.  Then Q should be granted eve-
rywhere.11 
This form of argument gives us ‘universal rights’ in the following 
sense:  Any community must grant right Q if Q is required to live well.  
Whether a given community grants Q is of no importance for whether 
they should grant Q.  The result thus is a universal necessity to grant a 
certain right, rather than a universal right itself.12  This necessity is norma-
tive in whatever sense the non-conventionalist justification of the practice 
is normative. 
Notice that the telos which justifies the practice may also justify each 
of its rules.  Suppose, for instance, that one important justification for the 
practice of democratic elections is that they enable the governed to con-
trol those who govern them.  Let R be a rule that forbids members of the 
electorate to make unlimited ‘donations’ to political parties.  Suppose fur-
ther that a lack of R causes a lack of control over the government on the 
part of those who donate little or nothing, that is, the vast majority of the 
governed (for evidence of this see: Gilens and Page [2014]).  Then we 
could argue that rule R must be part of the practice of democratic elections:  
Without R, we cannot achieve that which justifies our practice in the first 
place. 
                                                 
11 The same form of argument can be used to attack existing rights. 
12 Many human goods are realizable through multiple practices, of course, 
which could grant (slightly) different rights. 
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Conventionalism hence avoids relativism by appeal to non-relativist 
justifications of practices and their rules.  What, however, about the indi-
vidual’s rights and duties within these practices?  Can the conventionalist 
justification of them ground a genuinely moral normativity? 
9 How to Avoid Pseudo-Conventionalism 
This leads us back to the above Condition B.  Someone might grant that 
we now have a non-relativist moral theory, but worry about two things:  
First, that this was achieved at the cost of collapsing the two justifications 
again.  How would the suggested Aristotelian hybrid block the appeal to 
the purpose of the practice in justifying an individual’s right or duty?  This 
is what I shall show in the following paragraphs.  The second worry is 
that, if the theory truly blocks this appeal, then the individual’s rights or 
duties have no moral justification.  The theory provides a moral justifica-
tion for the practice of promising, for example, and also for the general 
duty to keep promises.  Its justification for Juliet’s duty to keep her prom-
ise to Romeo, however, is purely conventional.  My answer to this second 
worry is that Juliet has a moral duty whose justification is purely conven-
tional.  The whole point of the account is that moral duties can be con-
ventional. 
In order to address the first worry, we need to consider the dis-
tinction between the justification of a rule and the justification for its ap-
plication.  I start with the example of a leisure practice and then return to 
the moral case, since my argument is a general point about rule-following.  
The moral cases targeted by the wrong reason objection are simply par-
ticular instantiations. 
The justification for adding the offside rule to football, for in-
stance, was that, without it, the game is much less lively [Carosi 2010].  
Formulated in more abstract terms, we could say: 
Justification 1 (Rule): 
Rule R is necessary in order for practice P to function well. 
The justification for why Wambach’s goal against Colombia (in June 2015) 
did not count, however, was not that her behaviour made the game less 
lively.  The justification was that she was offside.  Given the offside rule, 
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the fact that Wambach stood in that particular position on the field rela-
tive to other players made it necessary for her not to kick the ball between 
the posts. 
Justification 2 (Rule Application): 
Given Rule R, Fact F makes it necessary for Agent A (not) to φ. 
On F3 (contractarianism and rule-consequentialism), justifications of the 
second kind derive from or are backed up by justifications of the first kind.  
We would argue: (2) Wambach’s action was not allowed and (1) actions 
of this kind are generally not allowed because they make the game less 
lively; therefore: (3) Wambach’s action was not allowed because it made 
the game less lively.  In ethics, this deduction opens the door to the wrong 
reason objection. 
Leisure examples show that this move is fallacious and that it would 
be fallacious even without the wrong reason objection:  (1) and (2) are 
true while (3) is false.  For one thing, Wambach would have been free to 
do all sorts of other things that would have made the game less lively (such 
as standing still for 90 minutes).  Second, the accusation of non-liveliness 
might not even have been true for her particular case.  (In fact, this was a 
particularly capturing moment of the game.)  Some moral philosophers 
make this fallacious move.  The reason why we should reject their claims, 
however, is not that this gives us an ad hoc response to the wrong reason 
objection, but that the move in general is fallacious. 
Let’s transfer what I said about football to my earlier democracy 
example.  In section 8, the following claim was about a rule:  The justifi-
cation for adding a cap to party donations is that, without this rule, the 
vast majority of the governed lack control over the government.  This is 
an instance of Justification 1.  Now, assume the US had been engaged in 
the well-functioning variety of P in 2016, and that the cap was $50,000.  
Given this rule, Renaissance Technologies would have had a duty not to 
donate $59,265,461 (in roughly equal amounts) to the two biggest US par-
ties (see Center for Responsive Politics [2017]).  This is an instance of 
Justification 2. 
Fact F here is the fact that Renaissance Technologies’ payments 
would have totalled $59,265,461. This fact makes it necessary for them 
not to donate the money.  Consider our fallacious deduction again.  In 
our imaginary world, it would be true that (2) Renaissance Technologies’ 
action was not allowed and that (1) actions of this kind are generally not 
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allowed because they lead to a lack of control for the vast majority of the 
governed.  But it would be incorrect to conclude:  (3) Renaissance Tech-
nologies’ action was not allowed because it led to a lack of control for the 
vast majority of the governed.  For one thing, even in that imaginary 
world, Renaissance Technologies might still be free to do other things that 
could lead to such a lack of control.  (Perhaps they are allowed to lobby 
against public funding for campaigns, to ensure that only rich individuals 
can run).  Second, the accusation of causing a lack of control might not 
even be true for their particular case.  (Unlikely, I admit; but since we are 
imagining a better world here, the victorious party might use their Renais-
sance Technologies co-funded victory to impose stricter controls of the 
cap on donations.) 
Conventionalism does not endorse (3).  On F2, the justification for 
Renaissance Technologies’ duty not to make this donation is the fact that 
their payments would have totalled $59,265,461.  This fact only consti-
tutes a justification within P—our improved practice of democratic elec-
tions.  (Just as the fact that little Betty measures 1.20m only constitutes a 
justification for not letting her ride the roundabout if the fair rules say you 
have to be at least 1.35m.)  On the suggested Aristotelian account, P itself 
has a justification, viz. to ensure control of the government by the gov-
erned.  And there was a justification for adding R to P, which was that R 
seemed necessary to ensure that control.  But we do not appeal to the 
justification of P nor of R, not even indirectly, in justifying Renaissance 
Technologies’ duty. 
Transfer this to the much-discussed example of promising, with 
which we started:  For a conventionalist, the fact that I announced to mow 
your lawn creates a duty for me—but only within the practice of promis-
ing.  Within that practice, my announcement makes it necessary for me to 
do as announced. 
It may be asked: “But what is this necessity?”  The answer is given only by 
describing the procedure, the language-game, which as far as concerns the 
‘necessity’ expressed in it does not differ from this one: “I say ‘ping’ and 
you have to say ‘pong’.” [Anscombe 1981a: 18] 
For promising, Anscombe and others argue that it is necessary for human 
beings to have this practice (see p. 5 above).  Any individual necessity 
within that practice, however, exists by convention and cannot be justified 
through that which necessitates the practice. 
This brings me to the second worry:  The individual promisor’s duty 
is conventional. Is this a reason to think that the duty is optional, not real, 
or not a moral duty?  My account says:  You have to pong, because I pinged, and 
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you wrong me if you don’t.  Our community plays the ping-pong game for good reasons. 
Its rules are as they are for good reasons.  If you nevertheless regard yourself as 
not morally obliged to pong (at least prima facie), this must be because you 
don’t consider the rules of justified practices as binding.  But that these 
rules are binding is just what it means that they (and the practice) are jus-
tified.  Whether or not you want to use the word ‘moral’ here, there is no 
reason to worry that conventionalism makes your rights and duties non-
binding. 
10 Conclusion 
The wrong reason objection is widely regarded as fatal to conventionalism 
about moral rights and duties.  In this paper, I defined genuinely conven-
tionalist theories as theories which justify a moral right or duty through a 
fact within a practice, and I argued that such theories identify the correct 
reasons for our moral rights and duties.  Various genuinely conventional-
ist theories are conceivable.  I briefly outlined one, which combines con-
ventionalism about moral rights and duties with an Aristotelian justifica-
tion of practices and their rules. 
Let me conclude by flagging what I take to be the two major selling 
points of conventionalism:  The first is the one for which I argued earlier, 
viz. that it gives the correct justification for our moral rights and duties.  
This was not true of the discussed ‘pseudo-conventionalist’ accounts.  
Many have argued, however (see p. 2 above), that it is also not true of the 
explicitly anti-conventionalist theories devised to replace them, especially 
Scanlon’s. 
The second point has not been discussed but should be flagged 
here:  Conventionalism provides a unifying moral framework.  The sug-
gested account applies to moral rights and duties from promising to prop-
erty, which makes it a true alternative to the accounts I analysed.  Contrary 
to that, most non-conventionalist alternatives treat promising only.  It is 
not obvious how their key ideas, such as justified expectations or intimate 
relations, would be transferred to other moral rights and duties. 
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